projects

In 2022, Roberto Foa and colleagues have examined how worldwide attitudes towards the major international powers – China, Russia, and the United States – have shifted in the wake of the Ukraine war, China’s rising assertiveness, and recent challenges to American democracy. They have harmonised and merged data from 30 global survey projects that collectively span 137 countries which represent 97% of world population. Their our analysis covers not only high-income democracies but also a comprehensive coverage of emerging economies and the Global South – revealing a marked divergence between the two. On the one hand, western democracies stand more firmly than ever behind the United States. Not only that, but the war in Ukraine has galvanised democratic societies worldwide – as the peoples of upper-income democracies in South America, the Asia-Pacific, and Eastern Europe have also moved to a more pro-American stance. However, across a vast span of countries stretching from continental Eurasia to the north and west of Africa, they have found the opposite – societies that have moved closer to China and Russia over the course of the last decade. As a result, China and Russia are now narrowly ahead of the United States in their popularity among developing countries.

While the war in Ukraine has accentuated this divide, it has been a decade in the making. As a result, the world is torn between two opposing clusters: a maritime alliance democracies, led by the United States; and a Eurasian bloc of illiberal or autocratic states, centred upon Russia and China. The authors suggest that this new cleavage cannot be reduced to simple economic interests or geopolitical convenience. Rather, it follows a clear political and ideological divide. Across the world, the strongest predictors of how societies align respective to China or the United States are their fundamental values and institutions – including beliefs in freedom of expression, personal choice, and the extent to which democratic institutions are practised and perceived to be legitimate.

In 2025, Francesco Rigoli has explored the British public's narratives regarding the war in Ukraine. After presenting a set of open-ended questions about the conflict to a representative sample of the British population, the author has analysed the data combining qualitative methods and AI to conduct automatic coding. The results reveal that, in Britain, people's views about the war in Ukraine vary substantially among people with different political orientations. Here the specific findings:

• Alleged causes of the conflict. Left-wing (versus right-wing) supporters are more likely to identify Russia's and Putin's greed as culprit. Right-wing (versus left-wing) supporters are more likely to stress Western responsibility alongside the Russian one, or to point to Russia feeling threatened.

• What Britain should do regarding the war in Ukraine. Left-wing (versus right-wing) supporters are more likely to encourage the British government to support Ukraine to continue fighting against Russia. Right-wing (versus left-wing) supporters are more likely to encourage the British government to disengage from supporting Ukraine or to seek an agreement between Ukraine and Russia.

• Why Britain should do this. When asked to motivate their suggestions about what Britain should do to deal with the war in Ukraine, left-wing (versus right-wing) supporters are more likely to call upon justice considerations and to assert that their suggested strategy prevents Russia attacking other countries. Right-wing (versus left-wing) supporters are more likely to stress the desire to stop the war as soon as possible and the importance to prioritise British interests.

Overall, the emerging picture is one where two different narratives about the war in Ukraine clash within the British public. One, prevalent on the left, blames Russia's greed and encourages the British government to fight alongside Ukraine in order to do justice and to stop Russia increasing its power. The other narrative, prevalent on the right, attributes some responsibility to the West as well, while encouraging the British government to withdraw support for Ukraine or to seek a diplomatic solution with the aim of stopping the war as soon as possible or of pursuing the British national interest.

In a scientific article published in the Lancet Psychiatry, Edgar Jones has examined similarities and differences between two large-scale emergency crises that have affected British society: the Blitz (a sustained bombing campaign carried out by Nazi Germany against the United Kingdom during World War II) and the recent COVID-19 pandemic. The Blitz has often been portrayed as a period of national resilience, yet historical evidence reveals that severe trauma and social disruption led to significant psychological distress among vulnerable groups. Classified wartime studies documented that, while most civilians coped with bombing stress, those exposed to intense trauma—such as high casualty rates, destruction of homes, and loss of employment—were at elevated risk of long-term mental illness. Mothers and children were particularly affected, suffering from evacuation stress and damage to schools.

Drawing on these insights, the article argues that similar risk factors apply to the COVID-19 pandemic. Communities with high infection and mortality rates, socio-economic deprivation, and job loss have been more susceptible to mental health problems, including anxiety, depression, and PTSD. 

Yet, the article highlights a key difference between the two crises. Unlike the Blitz, which fostered a sense of shared identity and community solidarity through collective activities, pandemic restrictions—such as lockdowns and social distancing—have fragmented social networks, reducing protective factors like belonging and mutual support. So, while both crises have involved mass trauma, their social contexts are different: wartime unity contrasts sharply with pandemic isolation, amplifying the mental health risks during the COVID-19 emergency.

In a scientific article published in the British Journal of Social Psychology, Özden Melis Uluğ and colleagues have investigated how, in post-conflict societies, ingroup identification influences collective narratives and, in turn, the willingness to forgive outgroup members. Using Northern Ireland as a case study, the authors have examined how Protestants and Catholics identify themselves and how this affects attitudes towards reconciliation. The authors found that strong ingroup identification often reinforces divisive narratives, such as viewing the other side’s actions as illegitimate or framing one’s own group as freedom fighters, thus reducing one's willingness to forgive. Specifically, for Protestants higher ingroup identification predicts endorsement of narratives emphasizing terrorism and rejection of independence, leading to lower forgiveness. Likewise, for Catholics stronger ingroup identification predicts endorsement of independence narratives, also linked to reduced forgiveness. Still, the research also shows that narratives emphasizing a shared Northern Irish identity are associated with greater forgiveness across both groups. These findings highlight that, in post-conflict societies, identity processes are critical in shaping collective narratives and in determining to what extent people are willing to reconcile with outgroup members. This suggests that peacebuilding efforts should not only address structural issues, but also promote narratives that foster common identity and mutual understanding. By doing so, societies emerging from conflict can overcome barriers to reconciliation and create conditions for lasting peace.